BS 

1475 
C3 


M?    710 


THE  RELATION  OF 


OOHELETH 


TO 


CONTEMPORARY  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 

A   Thesis  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the 
requirements  for  the  degree  of 

DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

SUBMITTED  BY 

GUSTAV  ARNOLD  CARSTENSEN,  M.A. 


NEW  YORK   UNIVERSITY 


19  O  3 


THE   RELATION  OF 


QOHELETH 


TO 


CONTEMPORARY  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 

A    Thesis  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the 
requirements  for  the  degree  of 

DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 
SUBMITTED  BY 

GUSTAV  ARNOLD  CARSTENSEN,  M.A. 

NEW   YORK    UNIVERSITY 


19  O  3 


AUTHORITIES. 


DELITZCH, 
PLUMPTRE, 
GINSBURG, 
SAMUEL  Cox, 
NOWACK, 


Commentaries. 


FINLAYSON,   The  Meditations  and  Maxims  of  Qoheleth. 
BRADLEY,    Lectures  on  Ecclesiastes. 

A¥RIGHT,    Ecclesiastes   in    Relation   to   Modern    Criticism    and 
Pessimism. 

HAUPT,    Paper  read  before  the  Oriental  Club  of  Philadelphia. 

CONDAMIN,     Etudes    sur    1'Ecclesiaste    in    "Revue    Biblique," 
October,  1899,  January,  1900. 

ROBERTSON  SMITH,    The  Old  Testament  in  the  Jewish  Church. 
ZELLER,   Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics. 
WEBER,  History  of  Philosophy. 
UEBERWEG,  History  of  Philosophy. 


296238 


CONTENTS. 


Introductory.     Date  and  Authorship  of  Qoheleth.     Canonicity 
of  the  Book.    General  mental  outlook  of  the  Author. 

II 

Comparison  with  Stoicism. 

Ill 

,      Comparison  with  Epicureanism. 

IV 

Comparison    of    Qoheleth    with    Certain    Phases    of    Modern 

Thought,  and  with  the  larger  hope  of  Paul  and 

the  Optimism  of  Robert  Browning. 


THE  RELATION  OF  QOHELETH 

TO 

CONTEMPORARY  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY. 


In  the  epilogue  to  the  book  called  nSnp  occurs  this  admoni- 
tion,* ^>p  pK  rain  cnDD  rwy  irnn  "on  ("My  son,  be  on  thy 

guard;  there  is  no  end  of  making  books  in  great  number.") 
The  commentaries  upon  this  strange  writing  (or  collection  of 
writings  ? )  are  so  many  and  diverse  as  to  afford  a  verification  of 
the  statement  and  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  warning.  To 
attempt  to  read  them  all  would  be  to  prove  the  next  observation : 

•urn  IW  nmn  3r6i  (And  much  study  is  a  weariness  of  fleshf). 
The  book  called  Ecclesiastes  seems  to  have  had  a  wonderful  fas- 
cination for  students  of  all  shades  of  belief  and  unbelief  ever 
since  its  admission  to  the  Canon.  Its  very  place  in  the  sacred 
writings  presents  one  of  the  most  puzzling  questions  at  the 
outset.  How  came  it  there?  What  induced  the  Jewish  doctors 
to  include  among  their  canonical  books  one  which  seemed  to  an 
influential  school  of  the  time  to  be  so  subversive  of  truths  as  set 
forth  in  the  books  upon  which  they  were  all  agreed?  This 
question,  as  well  as  many  others  to  which  our  limits  forbid  so 
much  as  an  allusion,  has  received  the  careful  consideration  of 
the  most  learned  and  thoughtful  scholars  only  to  be  answered  in 
ways  almost  as  contradictory  as  they  are  multitudinous.  Pro- 
fessor Haupt,  of  Johns  Hopkins  University,  disposes  of  the  ques- 
tion of  canonicity  by  arming  himself  cap-a-pie  and  driving  a 
coach  and  four  into  the  ranks  of  the  whole  army  of  exegetes 
and  proclaiming  in  his  rough-and-ready  manner  that  the  con- 
temporaries of  Ecclesiastes,  finding  themselves  unable  to  sup- 
press the  book,  "endeavored  to  darken  its  meaning  for  dogmatic 
purposes,  saying:  'Let  us  save  the  attractive  book  for  the  congre- 
gation, but  we  will  pour  some  water  in  the  author's  strong 

*Bccl.  xii,  12. 
flbid. 


wine.'  "*  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  upon  what  historical 
basis  the  Baltimore  professor  rests  his  assumption.  At  most, 
it  is  but  a  plausible  conjecture.  Equally  gratuitous  is  the 
other  assumption  that  the  canonicity  of  Qoheleth  is  set  aside  in 
St.  Luke's  Gospel  (xii,  15-31)  by  the  picture  presented  by  our 
Saviour  of  the  rich  man  who  said  to  his  soul :  ' '  Thou  hast  much 
goods  laid  up  for  many  years;  take  thine  ease,  eat,  drink  and 
be  merry."  "Thou  fool,"  says  the  Almighty,  "this  night  thy 
soul  shall  be  required  of  thee."  Professor  Haupt  naively  ob- 
serves that  no  one  but  himself  has  even  perceived  that  "these 
words  are  evidently  directed  against  Ecclesiastes. "  It  seems 
less  likely  that  so  self-evident  a  proposition  should  have  escaped 
the  attention  of  so  many  students,  than  that  it  should  be  so 
manifest  as  it  seems  to  be  to  the  mind  of  Professor  Haupt. 
Is  it  not  more  reasonable  to  conclude  in  the  absence  of  any 
demonstration  of  what  Professor  Haupt  in  his  utter  loneliness 
sets  forth,  that  the  weight  of  scholarship  rejects  any  such  infer- 
ence? It  is  clear  enough  that  there  is  a  condemnation  of  the 
Epicurean  teaching,  repeated  five  times  in  Qoheleth:  3^3  j^tf 
ifojD  DIE  WD1  ntorn  nntm  tebW  mtO  (There  is  nothing  better 
among  men  than  that  one  should  eat  and  drink  and  that  his 
soul  should  see  good  in  his  toil).f  But  this  is  not  to  say  that 
there  is  any  special  condemnation  of  the  book  Qoheleth.  But 
assuming  that  there  is  such  a  condemnation,  was  not  one  great 
burden  of  Christ's  teaching,  "Ye  have  heard  that  it  was  said  by 
them  of  old  time  ,  .  .  but  I  say  unto  you, ' '  etc.  It  by  no 
means  follows  that  because  the  teaching  of  Qoheleth  was  inferior 
to  that  of  the  Gospel,  Qoheleth  is  out  of  place  in  the  Canon.  On 
that  rule,  we  should  be  obliged  to  reject  the  teaching  of  Moses 
and  of  David.  Such  a  principle  would  ban  the  Decalogue  itself. 
Leaving  the  airy  generalizations  of  Professor  Haupt,  let  us  ex- 
amine the  facts.  Scholars  are  not  agreed  as  to  when  the  can- 
onicity of  Qoheleth  was  settled.  We  know  that  the  question  was 
long  debated  by  the  rival  schools  of  Hillel  and  Shammai.  Wright 
does  not  agree  with  Davidson  and  Graetz  that  the  question  was 
an  open  one  until  the  synod  of  Jamnia,  A.  D.  90.  He  also  op- 
poses the  statement  of  Robertson  Smith  that  Qoheleth  and  the 
Song  of  Solomon  "were  still  controverted  up  to  the  very  end  of 
the  first  Christian  century,"  and  seems  to  make  out  a  fairly  plain 
case  in  asserting  that  Qoheleth  was  regarded  as  Holy  Scripture 
in  the  time  of  Herod  the  Great,J  when  it  was  quoted  as  of  co- 
ordinate authority  with  the  Law  of  Moses.  The  controversy 
between  the  schools  seems  to  have  been  not  so  much  about  the 
canonicity  of  the  book,  as  about  its  relative  value.  Long  after 
the  Canon  was  closed,  certain  books  were  questioned,  and  this  not 

*Paper  read  before  the  Oriental  Club  of  Philadelphia,  1891. 
fVide  ii,  24;  iii,  13;  v,  17;  viii,  15;  xii,  22. 

JEcclesiastes  in  the  Light  of  Modern  Criticism  and  Pessimism,  p.  19 
et   seq.  -$f| 


always  by  unbelievers,  but  often  by  the  defenders  of  revelation. 
As  Delitzch  maintains,  the  Old  Testament  Canon,  like  the  New, 
had  its  antilegomena.  The  difficulties  were  settled  after  careful 
examination,  and  both  parties  to  the  controversy  agreed  in  the 
recognition  of  the  Divine  authority  of  the  disputed  facts.  This 
shows  how  wide  of  the  mark  must  be  any  theory  of  surreptitious 
juggling  with  popular  ignorance,  as  set  forth  by  Professor 
Haupt. 

To  accept  the  canonicity  of  Qoheleth  is  not  to  accept  the 
traditional  interpretations  of  the  Jews  and  early  Christians  as 
to  the  date  and  authorship  of  the  book.  Until  the  time  of  the 
Reformation  in  the  sixteenth  century,  commentators  were  prac- 
tically unanimous  in  ascribing  the  authorship  to  King  Solomon, 

as  the  opening  words  secni  to  imply:  "j^D  "in  p  rfrnp  ^O"l 
D^wrprj  (The  words  of  Qoheleth,  Son  of  David,  King  in  Jeru- 
salem i.  i.).  Modern  criticism,  with  like  unanimity,  rejects  the 
traditional  view  and  assigns  it  to  an  unknown  author  in  a  much 
later  period.  But  even  among  the  later  critics,  there  is  wide 
divergence  as  to  the  question  of  date.  Ewald,  Ginsburg  and 
Hengstenberg  assign  it  to  the  period  of  the  Persian  domination, 
and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  no  respectable  critic  places  the  date 
earlier  than  the  exile.  We  must  assume  at  least  an  approximate 
date  before  we  can  proceed  further  with  our  subject.  Suffice  it 
to  take  for  granted  that  the  literary  ethics  of  the  period,  what- 
ever the  date  may  be,  did  not  prevent  the  author  from  writing  in 
the  name  of  Solomon,  just  as  Plato  made  Socrates  the  spokesman 
in  his  dialectics.  A  similar  literary  device  which  deceives  no 
one,  and  is  not  intended  to  deceive,  is  seen  in  Holmes '  *  *  Autocrat 
of  the  Breakfast  Table,"  and  in  Robert  Browning's  "Rabbi  Ben 
Ezra;"  or  still  more  strikingly  in  the  "Sartor  Resartus" — in 
which  are  paralleled  the  strange  paradoxes  and  seeming  contra- 
dictions of  Qoheleth — Carlyle  recording  his  follies  and  doubts, 
and  the  inmost  secrets  of  his  life,  under  the  imaginary  expe- 
rience of  a,  mythical  German  professor,  and  doing  it  with  a  free- 
dom and  picturesqueness  which  would  not  be  possible  in  a  bald 
autobiography.  By  making  Solomon  his  mouth-piece,  in  philoso- 
phizing upon  human  life,  Qoheleth  employs  an  innocent  but 
telling  means  of  emphasizing  his  own  reflections.  Plumptre's 
ingenious  "ideal  biography"  may  be  somewhat  strained  in  some 
places;  nevertheless,  it  is  consistent  in  the  main,  with  the  inner 
structure  of  the  book.  Moreover,  the  most  rigid  adherents  of 
the  traditional  view  of  the  Solomonic  authorship  of  Qoheleth 
must  admit  that  other  sacred  writers  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  a 
literary  device  like  that  claimed  by  the  newer  criticism  for  Qohe- 
leth. The  greater  number  of  psalms,  for  example,  which  have 

the  superscription  m"6,  as  Delitzch  argues,  ' '  were  not  composed 
by  David  himself,  but  by  unknown  poets  who  transferred  them- 


8 

selves  in  thought  into  David's  place,  situation  and  feelings."  A 
notable  instance  is  Psalm  CXLIV,  which  Delitzch  thinks  was 
founded  upon  the  saying  of  David  in  his  duel  with  Goliath, 

mrrf>  •o  mrv  yimrp  rvjrai  D"ra  uh  ^  nin  ^npn  ^D  iypi 

DDHK  pin  ("And  that  all  this  assembly  may  know  that 

the  Lord  savetto  not  with  sword  and  spear ;  for  the  battle  is  the 
Lord's  and  he  will  give  you  into  our  hands").* 

A  still  more  striking  instance  is  furnished  by  Psalm  cvi,  which 
even  so  conservative  a  scholar  as  Perowne  admits  to  be  post- 
exilic.  The  first  and  the  last  two  verses  of  this  psalm  are  assigned 
by  the  writer  of  the  Chronicles  (I  Chron.  xvi)  to  David,  when 
he  describes  the  praises  which  were  sung  when  the  ark  was 
removed  from  the  house  of  Obed-Edom  to  the  tabernacle  which 
David  had  set  up  for  it  in  Jerusalem.  We  might  multiply  the 
instances,  both  ancient  and  modern,  of  the  literary  device  which 
meets  us  at  the  opening  of  Qoheleth ;  but  the  linguistic  evidences 
against  the  Solomonic  authorship  are  such  as  the  most  radical 
traditionalists  are  forced  to  admit.  The  Aramaisms  are  utterly 
inconsistent  with  pre-exilic  authorship — as  much  so  as  would  be 
the  appearance  of  such  words  as  "telephone"  and  "automobile" 
in  a  work  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Delitzch  affirms  that  unless 
this  book  be  post-exelic,  "there  is  no  history  of  the  Hebrew 
language."  The  feeble  attempt  has  been  made  to  explain  away 
these  linguistic  peculiarities  by  ascribing  them  to  a  spirit  of 
pedantry  in  Solomon;  but  whatever  may  have  been  Solomon's 
faults,  he  was  above  the  necessity  or  the  disposition  for  such 
silly  affectation.  While  there  is  substantial  agreement  among 
the  best  scholars  as  to  the  post-exilic  date,  there  is  not  a  little 
L divergence  as  to  closer  approximation.  Plumptre  argues 
strongly  for  the  first  quarter  of  the  second  century  B.  C.,  and 
cites  a  number  of  strong  traces  of  the  influence  of  the  Stoic 
and  Epicurean  schools  of  philosophy,  f  and  while  no  one  of  these 
may  be  convincing  in  itself,  there  is  a  cumulative  force  in  the 
array  of  striking  parallels  and  resemblances  which  goes  a  long 
way  towards  conclusive  demonstration.  It  is  worthy  of  note, 
moreover,  that  the  Jewish  critic  Durembourg  arrives  at  a  like 
conclusion  in  his  "La  Morale  de  1  'Ecclesiaste  (1895)."  He 
says,  "Judaism  has  had  the  rare  luck  of  falling  under  the 
control  of  philosophers  only  at  a  recent  date  .  .  .  .  If  we 
except  monotheism,  all  opinions  have  been  able  &  push  them- 
selves into  the  light However,  towards  the  begin- 
ning of  the  second  century  B.  C.  the  influence  of  Greek  Phil- 
osophy began  to  be  felt  in  Palestine.  The  ideas  of  Plato  con- 
cerning the  immortality  of  the  soul  began  to  be  diffused.  It  is 

*I   Sam.  xvii,  47. 
tCambridge  Bible,  p.  30  et  seq. 


to  this  doctrine  that  Qoheleth  alludes  in  Chapter  iii,  21  :  JTTP  *>£ 

rrnTi  noron  nm  r6y^  ton  r6yn  ci«n  ^n  nn 


in  insinuating  that  doubt  which  dominates  his  whole  work." 
Qoheleth  dares  not  to  dwell  upon  this  doctrine,  for  he  is  too 
much  attached  to  the  religion  of  his  fathers;  too  devout  and 
conscientious  a  Jew,  in  other  words,  to  regard,  without  suspicion, 
any  doctrine,  however  convincing  in  itself,  and  whatever  its  in- 
herent excellence,  if  it  be  taught  by  so  evil  a  thing  as  pagan 
philosophy.  "Qoheleth  belongs,  then,  to  the  second  quarter  of 
the  second  century  B.  C."  Graetz  goes  further  and  believes  the 
book  to  belong  to  the  time  of  Herod  the  Great  (10  B.  C.),  and 
sees  in  it  a  protest  against  the  asceticism  of  the  Essenes  and  the 
political  corruptions  of  that  reign.  However  this  may  be,  it  does 
not  affect  the  thesis  which  we  are  endeavoring  to  defend,  that 
j  Qoheleth  is  the  work  of  a  man  whose  views  of  life  were  largely 
^  ^traceable  to  the  Stoic  and  Epicurean  schools  of  philosophy.  The 
passage  (iii,  21)  quoted  above  is  a  good  point  of  departure  for  a 
study  of  the  author's  mental  attitude  throughout  the  book.  The 
unpointed  text  justifies  the  rendering  of  all  the  ancient  versions 
as  well  as  that  of  the  Vulgate,  as  follows  :  '  '  Who  knoweth  if  the 
spirit  of  the  children  of  Adam  goeth  upward,  and  if  the  spirit 
of  the  beast  goeth  downward?"  This  seemed  to  the  Massorites 
quite  inconsistent  with  the  character  of  a  book  which,  by  its 
place  in  the  Canon,  must  be  accepted  as  inspired.  The  very 

simple  device  of  pointing  n  in  r6yn  and  rmvi  &s  the  article  in- 
stead of  as  the  interrogative  particle,  would  give  a  possible 
rendering  which  would  be  quite  orthodox,  thus  :  '  '  Who  seeth  the 
spirit  of  man  which  goeth  upward  to  heaven,  and  the  spirit  of 
the  beast  which  goeth  downward  to  the  earth.  "  To  a  superficial 
observer  this  may  seem  an  allowable  rendering;  but  it  does  not 
correct  a  very  serious  difficulty  —  namely,  the  repetition  of  the 
pronoun  ton  in  the  second  number  of  the  phrase.  There  is  but 
one  way  of  accounting  for  this  repetition.  It  is  to  make  clear 
the  fact  that  the  participles  r6jJ—  (n)  and  rTTP—  (n)  are  not  in 
apposition  with  the  noun  nil-  The  interrogative  form  is  con- 
sistent, not  only  with  the  LXX,  the  Peshito  and  the  Vulgate,  but 
in  St.  Jerome's  other  version  (that  in  his  commentary,  Migne, 
P.  L.  xxiii,  1041)  we  read  "Et  quis  scit  spiritus  filiorum  hominis, 
si  ascendat  ipse  sursum,  et  spiritus  pecoris  si  descendat  ipse 
deorsum  in  terram?"  The  interrogative  rendering,  moreover, 
is  the  only  one  consistent  with  the  context;  for  if  we  read  in 
vv,  19-20,  that  judging  from  external  appearances  men  die  like 
beasts,  and  then  in  v,  20  a  parenthetical  exclamation  that  a 
man's  ni"V  ascends  to  heaven  and  a  beast's  ni"l  descends  to  the 
earth,  how  can  we  account  for  the  conclusion  which  he  im- 


10 

mediately  draws  in  v,  22.  "So  I  saw  that  there  was  nothing 
better  than  that  man  should  rejoice  in  his  works,  for  that  isj  his 
portion."  Giving  v.  21  the  interrogative  rendering,  the  passage 
19-22  is  consistent  throughout.  In  support  of  this  statement  let 
us  note  carefully  the  latter  portion  of  v.  22,  mtr6  UK^  ">£  *2 
VHriK  rPiTW  HDD-  The  ancient  versions  render  TnnN  as  follows : 
LXX,  J*£T'  OCVTOV,  Vulgate  "post  se  futura," — the  plain  sense 
of  which  its  "after  his  death"  and  Franz  Delitzch  avers  very 
positively  that  VHntf  must  and  can  mean,  only  and  always, 
that  which  follows  the  present  life.  It  has  been  necessary  to 
go  into  this  question  of  interpretation  rather  fully,  because 
so  much  that  is  perplexing  in  the  remainder  of  the  book  may  be 
explained  if  we  have  a  correct  understanding  of  this  passage. 
Wright  argues  (p.  192)  that  the  interrogative  clauses  do  not 
convey  the  insinuation  that  there  is  no  difference  between  man 
and  beast.  "On  the  contrary,"  he  says,  "these  interrogative 
clauses  suggest,  if  they  do  not  actually  assert,  the  very  opposite. ' ' 
He  then  proceeds  to  indicate  a  probable  reference  to  an  aphor- 
ism in  the  Book  of  Proverbs,  TlD  )J7D^  b^Wnh  rbyvb  D"!"!  m« 
nZOD  ^KWO  (Prov.  xv,  24),  which  is  rendered  in  the  Revised  Ver- 
sion, "To  the  wise  the  way  of  life  (goeth)  upward  that  he  may 
depart  from  Sheol  beneath;  "and  in  the  Authorized  Version,  "The 
way  of  life  is  above  to  the  wise,  that  he  may  depart  from  hell  be- 
neath." The  former  rendering  is  substantially  identical  with 
that  of  Wright,  "The  wise  man  goes  the  way  of  life  which  leads 
upwards  in  order  that  he  may  depart  from  Sheol  downwards." 
"In  other  words,"  says  Wright,  "the  wise  man  proceeds  on  the 
way  of  life  which  leads  one  upwards,  with  the  distinct  object 
before  him  of  escaping  from  the  path  which  leads  to  Sheol  and 
ends  there."  He  then  proceeds  to  argue  upon  the  strength  of 
Delitzch 's  testimony,  that  the  word  "Sheol"  at  the  time  that 
the  passage  in  Proverbs  was  written,  had  begun  to  lose  its  former 
general  signification  as  a  place  of  gloom  even  for  the  righteous, 
but  to  which  all  alike  were  obliged  to  descend  at  the  death  of  the 
body,  and  to  take  on  the  meaning  of  a  place  of  punishment  for 
the  ungodly.  However,  the  meaning  appears  never  to  have  be- 
come general;  and  even  if  it  had  been  so  understood  and  used 
by  Qoheleth,  we  shall  still  have  to  account  for  the  singular  incon- 
gruity of  such  a  reflection  with  the  context  as  has  been  indicated 
above.  At  best,  Wright's  position  is  a  precarious  one.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  Jew,  up  to  this  time,  had  formed  as  high  a  con- 
ception of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  as  that  taught  by  Plato. 
The  Old  Testament  is  wanting  in  any  direct  or  positive  teaching 
of  the  inherent,  or  even  potential,  immortality  of  the  soul.  The 
Jews  never  thought  of  death  as  anything  but  a  punishment. 
"Sheol"  is  invariably  pictured  in  sombre  colors.  The  thought 


11 

of  going  there  is  always  a  forbidding  one.  They  knew  no  such 
prayer  as  "Reqttiescant  in  pace/'  for  such  mortals  as  had 
"fallen  asleep;"  they  could  only  wail  and  lament  for  those  "qui 
descendunt  in  infernum."  Why  should  such  a  passage  in 
Qoheleth  seem  strange  when  it  accords  so  nearly  with  "the 
writing  of  Hezekiah  when  he  had  been  sick  (Isiah  xxxviii,  9-20), 

of  which  the  whole  conclusion  seems  to  be,  "in  ""TV  1"OttP  tfb 
"pON  ^K  (v.  18),  "They  that  go  down  into  the  pit  cannot 
hope  for  thy  truth."  (R.  V.)  Why  should  one  recoil  from 
Qoheleth  more  than  from  such  a  passage  as  Job  iii,  13,  nntf  'O 
mpttW!  TQDW>  "For  now  should  I  have  lien  down  and  been 
quiet"  (R.  V.)  or  Psalm  Ixxxviii,  10-20,  "Wilt  thou  show  won- 
ders to  the  dead  .  .  .  Shall  thy  loving  kindness  be  de- 
clared in  the  grave,  or  thy  faithfulness  in  Abaddan?  Shall;  thy 
wonders  be  known  in  the  dark?  And  thy  righteousness  in  the 
land  of  forgetfulness?"  (R.  V.)  or  Psalm  cxiv,  17,  "The  dead 
praise  not  the  Lord,  neither  any  that  go  down  into  silence. ' '  In 
these  two  books,  Psalms  and  Job,  may  be  found  contradictions 
as  glaring  as  any  in  Qoheleth.  For  example :  in  Job  xix,  25-27, 

we  read,  ' '  For  I  know  that  my  ^M  liveth  and  that  he  shall  stand 
up  at  the  last  upon  the  dust;  and  after  my  skin  hath  been  de- 
stroyed this;  (shall  be)  even  from  (or  without)  my  skin  shall 
I  see  God  whom  I  shall  see  on  my  side,  and  mine  eyes  shall  behold 
and  not  another."  (R.  Y.)  or  Psalm  xvi,  10,  "Thou  will  not 
leave  my  soul  to  Sheol ;  neither  wilt  thou  suffer  thy  beloved  one 
to  see  the  pit. "  It  is  aside  from  our  present  purpose  to  do  more 
than  try  to  show  that  these  two  books,  which  were  never  among 
the  antilegomena,  as  was  Qoheleth,  present  just  as  striking  con- 
trasts as  are  found  between  the  early  part  of  Qoheleth  and  the 
Epilogue.  When  we  confront  these  apparent  inconsistencies, 
does  it  not  seem  wise  to  conclude  with  Kaufmann*  that  "the 
simplest  explanation  is  the  best,"  and  that  "Qoheleth  is  an  an- 
cient who  has  not  all  the  methods  of  thinking  of  Mill  or  Schopen- 
hauer— he  is  not  even  a  Montaigne ;  he  is  not  a  Frenchman,  but 
a  Semite.  His  work  is  not  a  rhapsody  of  disjecta  membra.  It 
is  the  work  of  a  believer  in  a  struggle  with  doubt,  who  sometimes 
contradicts  himself  as  did  Job  and  David  and  Augustine  and 
Pascal." 

Before  proceeding  further,  it  may  fortify  our  position  to  quote 
Bishop  Hanebergf  in  dealing  with  the  difficulties  in  the  teaching 
of  Qoheleth.  "They  are  best  met,"  he  says,  "if  we  admit  (1) 
that  it  was  written  in  times  of  terrible  anarchy  and  decay  (about 
200  B.  C.)  and  that  it  was  upon  life  not  absolutely,  out  as  he 
witnessed  it,  that  the  writing  passes  sentence  and  (2)  that  he 

*Expositor,  June,  1899. 

fGeschichte  der.  bibl.  Offenbarung,  p.  53. 


12 

stands  between  the  pre-exilie  period,  when  the  individual  found 
his  end  in  membership  with  his  God-loved  free  nation,  and  the 
Christian  dispensation  with  its  clear  and  constant  doctrine  of 
the  fuller  life  beyond  the  grave;  and  that  hence,  as  the  cere- 
monial law,  according  to  St.  Paul,  so  this  book  also  helps  to 
demonstrate  the  insufficiency  of  that  covenant  which  was  then 
decaying  and  near  its  end." 

II. 

If  we  have  succeeded  in  demonstrating  the  unity  oi}  Qoheleth, 
and  that  it  belongs  to  a  period  subsequent  to  the  Alexandrine 
era  (333  B.  C.),  we  are  prepared  to  find  in  it  traces  of  the  influ- 
ences of  Greek  Philosophy.  Well-bred  Jews  began  to  be  versed 
in  Greek,  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  the  Rabbis  en- 
deavored to  exclude  from  the  Canon  a  work  which  exhibited  such 
marked  tendencies  to  foreign  modes  of  thought  and  expression 
as  were  utterly  alien  to  Jewish  culture.,  Let  us  try  to  form 
some  idea  of  what  these  Grecian,  or  Graeco-Roman,  influences  are. 

In  the  first  chapter,  Qoheleth  sets  forth  his  cosmological  con- 
ceptions. He,  like  the  Stoics,  seems  to  have  adopted  the  theories 
of  Heraclitus — the  cardinal  principle  of  which  is  that  of  change ; 
no  bevn£[± _iulL  & L-Constant  becoming.  With  this  thought  he  sets 
ouT,  and  to  this  thought  he  returns ;  and  to  nearly  every  inquiry 

which  he  raises,  he  adds  the  reflection  r\T\  mjni  ^DH  ^OH  (ii,  11), 
* '  All  is  vanity  and  striving  after  wind. ' '  Heraclitus  taught  that 
the  primordial  element  was  7tvp\  all  material  existence  emanates 
from  nvp  and  returns  to  nvp.  What  the  Stoics  meant  by  nvp, 
Qoheleth  explains  by  the  term  Qv6fr<,  which  we  are  accustomed 
to  render  "God;"  but  the  Hebrews  generally  used  the  word 
nirP  in  referring  to  the  Supreme  Being — the  name  of  their 
national  God.  Now  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  Qoheleth,  although 
a  Jew,  uses  the  word  D^"6tf  about  thirty  times,  and  nvn  never 
once.  Surely  this  is  design,  and  not  accident.  The  root  idea 
of  Q\"6tf  is  supreme,  might  or  power.  The  plural  form  is  inten- 
sive, and  what  Hebrew  word  is  there  which  would  better  express 
Heraclitus'  notion  ofnvp?  This  DTI^Ki  Qoheleth  says,  has  set 
all  things  in  motion.  All  things  are  in  perpetual  flux;  there  is 
an  endless  alternation  of  creation  and  destruction,  not  only  in  all 
matter,  organic  and  inorganic,  but  even  in  those  human  processes 
which  we  call  psychical.  Beginning  with  man  as  the  microcosm, 
Qoheleth  proceeds  to  the  macrocosm  beyond  and  above  man,  to 
show  that  each  is  dependent  upon,  and  complementary  to,  the 
other.  By  way  of  introduction,  Qoheleth  begins  as  follows: 


13 

may  C^y1?  ^1K,11  K2  mi  "]^1  in  (i.  4),  (One)  generation 
passeth  and  (another)  generation  cometh,  but  the  inhabitants* 
(V1N)  abide  forever.  At  the._very  outset,  Qoheleth  would  fa- 
miliarize his  reader  with  the  notion  of  change.  One  generation 
passes  out  of  existence,  another  comes  into  "existence,  and  this 
cycle  must  go  on  forever.  This  course  must  and  always  will  be 
renewed,  so  that  the  same  objects,  events  and  actions  will  recur 
indefinitely,  reappear  and  recur.  Turning  to  the  universe  and 
the  forces  therein  operating,  he  sets  forth  the  four  elements 
which  for  him,  as  for  Heraclitus,  constituted  all  things  in  nature. 

In  i,  5,  we  read :  Kin  Hill  P)K11P  IDIpD  ^>K1  WDttM  Kin  WDttM  Hill 
DW>  "The  sun  also  ariseth  and  the  sun  goeth  down  and  hasteth 
to  his  place  where  he  ariseth."  (E.  V.)  The  word  Pjtfttf  means  to 

"pant"  or  to  "breathe  hard" — expressing  intense  longing  or 
desire ;  and  Qoheleth  seems  to  indicate  here  the  innate  tendency 
of  all  things  to  return  to  their  primordial  source;  henc&Jbhe, 
figure  of  strong  exertion  and  striving  to  attain  the  original 

principle.  In  i,  6,  we  read,  32D  221D  ]lDy  hti  2^101  0111  bti  *f?in 
min  DW  ITQ'QD  Syi  nnn  T^lHi  * '  The  wind,  going  toward  the  north 

and  circling  toward  the  south  goes  circling,  circling,  and  the 
wind  returns  (again  and  again)  to  its  circlings."f  J_n__these 
verses  appear  the  four  elements  from  which  all  things  proceed 
and  to  which  all  things  return;  viz.,  fire,  water,  air  and  the 
earth.  The  earth  is  mentioned  first,  because  she  is,  as  it  were, 
the  mother";  nexTthe  sun,  because  of  his  intense  heat — he  is  the 
generative  fire ;  then  follow  the  air  and  the  water. 


expression  also  in-ir  7,  "All  the  streams  run  into  the  sea,  yet 
the  sea  is  not  full" — which  may  be  taken  as  a  part  of  the  refer- 
ence to  the  four  elements  and  which  strikingly  resembles  a 
theory  of  Heraclitus,  which  the  Stoics  adopted. 

According  to  ZellerJ  they  held  that  the  sun  is  sustained  by 
the  vapors  from  the  sea;  the  moon  by  those  from  fresh  water, 
and  the  stars  by  those  from  the  land.  This  notion  of  vapors 
rising  from  the  sea  to  higher  regions  of  space  was  most  likely 
taught  the  Hebrews  by  the  Greeks;  although  it  can  hardly  be 
affirmed  that  it  was  originally  a  Greek  conception.  Without 
being  able  to  cite  any  authority,  the  writer  is  impressed  with 
the  belief  that  some  Hebrew  writers  set  forth  the  opinion  that 
the  sun  and  the  moon  attract  the  vapors  of  the  waters,  thus 
supplying  themselves  with  new  matter,  to  prevent  annihilation ; 
but  certainly  these' opening  verses  of  Qoheleth  contain  an  elabo- 

*An  allowable  synecdoche. 

|See  marginal  rendering,  A.  V. 

JStoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics,  p.  200  et  seq. 


14 

ration  of  the  idea  which  would  not  be  expected  in  one  unfamiliar 
with  the  views  of  the  Stoics.  The  emphasis  laid  upon!  the  insta- 
bility of  material  things  is  different  from  anything  found  else- 
where in  the  canonical  scriptures,  and  is  surely  opposed  to  the 
whole  spirit  of  the  Old  Testament.  Furthermore,  the  idea  that 
all  things  move  in  cycles,  and  that  the  elements  after  returning 
to  their  original  sources  repeat  the  exact  processes  indefinitely, 
is  a  very  clear  evidence  of  the  influence  of  Stoic  philosophy.  In 
the  midst  of  all  this  change  in  the  universe,  the  only  thing  which 
Qoheleth  regards  as  stable  is  the  earth ;  which,  he  seems  to  say, 
is  the  constant  scene  of  the  operation  of  external  forces.  It  is 

the  earth  alone  which  "abideth  forever"  (mDJ7  0^)-  It  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  Qoheleth  is  more  poet  than  philosopher, 
and  we  arrive  at  his  ideas  of  cosmogony  only  through  casual 
expressions  or  suggestions.  His  main  purpose  was  not  to 
elaborate  a  system  of  philosophy,  but  to  contemplate  man  as 
man  in  his  relation  to  things  essential  to  his  survival ;  and  surely 
the  earth,  upon  which  man  exists,  and  of  which  he  forms  a  part, 
is  the  thing  most;  closely  related  to  him.  This  geocentric  notion 
is  also  one  of  the  principles  of  the  Stoics,  who  believed  that 
the  earth  was  created  before  anything  else  in  the  universe.  "By 
the  mutual  play  of  these  four  elements  the  world  is  formed,  built 
round  the  earth  as  a  centre ;  heat,  as  it  is  developed  out  of 
water,  moulding  the  chaotic  mass."*  In  i,  8,  Qoheleth  sets  forth 

Jiis-notion  of  constant  flux  in  the  universe —  DTO  Dnmn  ^D, 
All  things  are  full  of  weariness  (go  through  the  same  processes 
and  in  the  same  manner).  It  is  a'  perpetual  going  from,  and  re- 
turning to,  the  primary  condition.  "Man  cannot  utter  (it)  the 
eye  is  not  satisfied  with  seeing,  nor  the  ear  filled  with  hearing. ' ' 
(R.  V.)  The  influence  of  Greek  thought  is  still  more  manifest  in 
the  verses  which  follow.  It  will  suffice  to  quote  the  rendering  of 
the  Revised  Version.  "That  which  hath  been  is  that  which  shall 
be ;  and  that  which  hath  been  done  is  that  which  shall  be  done ; 
and  there  is  no  new  thing  under  the  sun.  Is  there  a  thing  whereof 
men  say,  See,  this  is  new  ?  it  hath  been  already  in  the  ages  which 
were  before  us.  There  is  no  remembrance  of  the  former  (genera- 
tions) neither  shall  there  be  any  remembrance  of  the  latter  (gen- 
erations) that  are  to  come,  among-  those  that  shall  come  after." 
(i,  9-11).  It  seems  impossible  to  read  this  without  the  conviction 
that  Qoheleth  had  adopted  the  Stoical  idea,  that  as  soon  as  the 
course  of  the  world  has  come  to  an  end,  "the  formation  of  a  new 
world  will  begin  so  exactly  corresponding  with  the  previous 
world,  that  every  particular  thing,  every  particular  person,  and 
every  occurrence  will  recur  in  it,  precisely  as  they  occurred  in 

*Zeller,  op.  cit.  pp.  161-4. 


15 

the  world  preceding."*  According  to  Senecaf,  Veniet  iterum 
qui  nos  ivb  lucem  reponat  dies.  i '  This  applies  to  every  fact  and 
to  every  occurrence  in  the  new  world  at  the  TraXiyysveaia  or 
aTttinaTaaraiGiS  (as  the  return  of  a  former  age  is  called)  :  thus 
there  will  be  another  Socrates,  who  will  marry  another  Xan- 
tippe,  and  be  accused  by  another  Anytus  and  Meletus.f  Hence 
Marcus  Aurelius§  deduces  his  adage  that  "nothing  new  happens 
under  the  sun. ' '  Qoheleth  not  only  adopts  this  view  of  physical 
phenomena,  but  extends  the  principle  to  psychical  conditions. 
The  same  law  which  brings  about  the  interchange  and  interplay 
of  things  contrary  to  each  other  in  the  external  life  of  the  world, 
is  manifest/  also  in  the  internal  life  of  man.  Waking  and  sleep- 
ing, youth  and  old  age,  sorrow  and  joy — all  these  opposing  forces 
constitute  the  motive  power  of  human  action;  in  other  words, 
are  the  prime  factors  which  make  up  "life."  The  strife  or  con- 
trast of  opposing  forces  is  what  makes  men  live.  Mark  how 

forcibly  this  idea  is  developed  in,  iii,  1-8,  pi^itf  .  .  .  hlh 
"A  time  to  be  born  and  a  time  to  die,  etc."  Heraclitus,  in 
elucidating  his  idea  of  "contrary  currents,"  taught  that  nothing 
Originates  or  exists  except  by  the  opposition  of  contraries.  "Or- 
ganic life  is  produced  by  the  male  and  the  female;  musical 
harmony  by  sharp  and  flat  notes;  it  is  sickness  that  makes  us 
appreciate  health;  without  exertion,  there  can  be  no  sweet 
repose;  without  dangers,  no  courage;  without  evil  to  overcome, 
no  virtue.  Evil  does  not  exist  without  good,  nor  good  without 
evil.  Evil  is  a  relative  good  and  good  is  a  relative  evil.  Like 
being  and  non-being,  good  and  evil  disappear  in  the  universal 
harmony. "||  Qoheleth,  to  be  sure,  is  not  very  scientific  in  his 
statements;  he  has  Macau! ay's  fondness  for  striking  antitheses 
and  may  sacrifice  clearness  to  an  epigram  or  an  alliteration; 
but  his  leading  idea  is  manifest,  viz.,  that  contrast  is  our  measure 
and  appreciation  of  things,  as  well  as  the  motive  power  of  action. 
For  Qoheleth  there  can  be  no  hate  without  love ;  no  pain  without 
pleasure  and  vice  versa.  Qoheleth  proceeds  to  inquire  why  this 
general  law  obtains;  and  the  only  answer  that  he  can  get  is 

DT"6K'  He  is  the  cause  of  all ;  he  has  ordered  all ;  he  is  the  un- 
knowable and  uncontrollable  power. 

In  the  twelfth  chapter,  Qoheleth  seems  to  look  forward  to  the 
destruction  of  the  world.  Here  his  style  reaches  the  summit  of 
poetic  fancy.  As  he  pointed  out  in  the  first  chapter  the  beneficial 
results  of  the  generative  power  of  fire,  so  in  the  last  chapter 
Qoheleth  sets  forth  the  results  of  the  extinction  of  the  sun  with 
its  heat  and  light.  In  thus  postulating  an  end  of  the  world,  he 
agrees  with  Greek  philosophy,  especially  Heraclitus.  It  must 
not  be  overlooked,  however,  that  the  earth,  after  everything  on 

*Zeller,  op.  cit.  pp.  166-67.      fZeller,  op.  cit.  p.  167.         JEp.  36,  10. 
§Lib.  viii,  19.  HWeber,  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  35. 


16 

it  has  been  annihilated,  continues  its  existence  as  an  element  until 
the  world  begins  to  repeat  its  course.  This  may  be  inferred  from 
xii,  7.  rvn  .  .  .  3ttn\  "And  the  dust  will  return  to  the 
earth  as  it  was."  The  earth,  it  is  assumed,  is  one  of  the  four 
elements;  everything  which  originated  from  it  must  of  necessity 

return  to  it;  and  (v.  7  b),  roro  ....  rmrn,  "the  breath 
(or  soul)  will  return  to  DM /K who  gave  it."  Lucretius  taught 
the  same  doctrine  :*  * '  Credit  item  retro  de  terra  quod  f uit  ante, 
in  terras,  et  quod  missum  est  ex  aetheris  oris,  id  rursum  coeli 
relatum  templa  receptant,"  Before  this  verse,  the  theologians 
stood  aghast  and  helpless.  They  attempted  various  explanations, 
all  of  them  allegorical,  and  quite  naturally  their  conclusions 
were  contradictory,  each  of  all  the  others.  The  most  reasonable 
hypothesis  seems  to  be  that  Qoheleth  had  in  mind  an  earthquake 
as  the  cause  of  the  general  annihilation.  There  is  one  more 
passage  (and  this  from  the  epilogue  of  Qoheleth)  which  sug- 
gests a  thought  of  Marcus  Aurelius — ''the  flower  of  Stoicism." 
Although  Qoheleth  is  separated  from  the  Antonine  Emperor  by 
an  interval  of  between  two  and  three  centuries,  it  is  certain  that 
the  Roman  Stoic  would  never  have  quoted  an  author  of  the 
despised  Jewish  race.  There  must,  therefore,  be  some  common 
source  from  which  both  have  borrowed.  Compare  Ecclesiastes 
xii,  12 :"  There  is  no  end  of  making  many  books  in  great  number 
and  much  study  is  a  weariness  of  flesh,"  with  Marcus  Aurelius 
ii,  2-3:  Leave  off  from  books  .  .  .  "Rid  yourself  of  the 
thirst  for  books."  Enough  has  been  said  to  show  the  general 
similarity  of  the  thought  of  Qoheleth  to  that  of  the  Stoics.  There 
are  also  certain  Graecisms  of  expression  in  Qoheleth  which  tend 
to  establish  this  position.  Among  these  we  may  note  the  fol- 
lowing from  the  list  of  the  Catholic  scholar  Zirkel: 

TtO  miZW  =  fv  TipaTTsiv  (iii,  12);  n31LD  DV  =  evffftspfet 
(vii,  14);  nD1  in  conjunction  with  2110  =  «*Aof  nayadoS  (v,  17), 
-yiH  —  ffHSTtreffOai  (i,  13;  ii,  3);  WDWH  nnn  =  v<j>  rfXico.  The 
one  great  inconsistency  with  the  Stoical  philosophy  in  Qoheleth 
is  the  general  tendency  towards  what  seems  to  be  a  reckless 
disregard  of  social  relations  and  an  individual  abandonment  to 
the  stern  and  inflexible  fate  which  nature  seems  to  assign  to  men 
so  arbitrarily  whether  they  be  good  or  bad,  wise  or  foolish.  The 
watchword  of  Stoicism 'was  resignation;  its  great  rule  was  to 
live  conformably  to  nature ;  so  that  while  Qoheleth  looks  to  Stoi- 
cism for  his  physics,  his  ethical  principles  seem  to  come  from 
another  quarter.  In  a  word,  while  his  thought  was,  in  the  main, 
Stoic,  his  habit  seems  to  have  been  Epicurean.  This  brings  us 
to  the  consideration  of  Epicurean  influences  in  Qoheleth,  which 
we  reserve  for  the  next  chapter. 

*De  Rerum  Natura,  ii,  998. 


17 


III. 

According  to  Epicureanism,  the  summum  bonum  is  pleasure. 
Qoheleth  agrees  with  Epicureanism  that  the  possession  of  a 
tranquil  spirit  is  necessary  to  the  pursuit  of  pleasure.  Neither 
looks  upon  carnal  indulgence  as  pleasure,  because  such  enjoy- 
ments are  fleeting  and  their  consequences  painful  and  disastrous ; 
and  both  Qoheleth  and  Epicurus  seek  to  avoid  all  pain,  especially 
such  as  is  caused  by  a  disturbed  condition  of  the  mind.  Pleasure 
is  two-fold — mental  and  physical — and  each  is  concomitant  of 
the  other.  Wisdom  and  intelligence  are  the  noblest  objects  of 
desire.  Although  we  cannot  attain  to  the  real  knowledge,  "and 
even  if  the  wise  says  he  knows  it,  he  is  not  correct;  he  cannot 

find  it,"  Mnb  ^ov  *^>  ny"6  ornn  "iDto  c«  en  (viii,  17),  yet  we 

can  be  guided  by  wisdom  and  attain  to  tranquillity  of  mind.  This 
is  why  Qoheleth  so  often  contrasts  wisdom  with  folly.  He  hates 
folly,  but  loves  wisdom,  with  all  his  heart  and  soul,  and  cites 
numberless  examples  to  prove  its  beneficient  power.  Wisdom 
and  intelligence,  according  to  Qoheleth  and  the  Epicureans,  give 
us  immunity  from  fear  of  whatever  sort,  and  make  us  inde- 
pendent of,  and  superior  to,  inordiante  passions  and  vain  desires. 
We  hold  ourselves  in  check  and  thus  are  enabled  to  assume  the 
right  attitude  towards  pain  and  pleasure,  so  as  to  take  to  our- 
selves the  maximum  of  enjoyment  with  the  minimum  of  dis- 
comfort. If  pleasure  was  to  be  the  supreme  object  of  life,  some 
way  had  to  be  found  to  put  away  the  fear?  of  death.  Upon  this 
point,  Epicurus  expresses  himself  as  follows :  * '  Our  fear  of  death 
is  not  caused  by  our  dread  of  non-existence;  what  makes  us 
regard  it  with  such  terror  is  the  fact  that  we  involuntarily  asso- 
ciate with  the  idea  of  nothingness,  an  idea  of  life,  i.  e.,  the  notion 
of  feeling  this  nothingness;  we  imagine  that  the  dead  man  is 
conscious  of  his  gradual  extinction ;  that  he  feels  himself  burning 
or  devoured  by  the  worms;  that  the  soul  continues  to  exist  and 

to  feel As  long  as  we  are  alive,  death  does  not 

exist  for  us ;  and  when  death  appears,  we  no  longer  exist.  Hence 
we  can  never  come  into  contact  with  death;  we  never  feel  its 
icy  touch  which  we  dread  so  much,  consequently,  we  should  not 
be  hindered  by  foolish  fears  from  attaining  the  goal  of  our  exist- 
ence— happiness.*  Qoheleth  takes  precisely  the  same  stand  when 
he  says,  ' '  A  living  dog  is  better  than  a  dead  lion.  For  the  living 
know  that  they  shall  die;  but  the  dead  know  not  anything, 
neither  have  they  any  more  a  reward,  for  the  memory  of  them 
is  forgotten"  (ix,  4-6).  That  is  to  say,  as  long  as  the  shadow  of 
the  hereafter  exists  in  our  minds,  unalloyed  pleasure  is  an  iinpos- 

*See  Weber's  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  138,    et.  seq.  and  Diogenes 
of  Laerte,  x,  140. 


18 

sibility.  That  there  can  be  any  such  combination  as  pleasure 
and  suffering,  Qoheleth,  like  the  Epicureans,  seems  to 
deny.  ' '  Corpus  sine  dolore :  animus  sine  perturbatione ' '  is  their 
maxim.  This  view,  they  hold,  requires  them  to  break  away  from 
many  long  in-bred  notions.  Time  and  again,  Qoheleth  asserts, 
with  great  positiveness,  that  we  need  not,  and  should  not,  fear 
anything;  because  there  is  nothing  to  be  feared  since  everything 
ends  with  death.  "Whatever  attaineth  to  do  by  thy  strength, 
(that)  do;  for  there  is  no  work,  nor  device,  nor  knowledge,  nor 

wisdom  in  ^INW  whither  thou  goest"  (ix,  10).  Of  course  we 
know  that  we  are  doomed  to  die;  but  we  also  know  that  death 
terminates  all  existence;  there  is  no  such  thing  as  immortality; 
we  are  resolved  into  the  same  elements  of  which  we  were  origin- 
ally composed.  This  negation  of  immortality  is  forcibly  empha- 
sksed-m  the  third  chapter,  verses  19-20,  "The  sons  of  men  are 
a  chance,  and  the  beasts  are  a  chance,  and  one  thing  befalleth 
them ;  as  the  one  dieth,  so  dieth  the  other ;  yea,  they  have  all  one 
breath,  (nn)  and  man  hath  no  pre-eminence  above  the  beasts; 
for  all  is  vanity.  All  go  into  one  place ;  all  are  of  the  dust,  and 
all  turn  to  dust  again."  And  again  in  the  ninth  chapter  at  the 
second  verse,  we  read :  ' '  All  things  come  alike  to  all :  there  is  one 
event  to  the  righteous  and  to  the  wicked ;  to  the  good  and  to  the 
clean  and  to  the  unclean :  to  him  that  sacrificeth  and  to  him  that 
sacrificeth  not;  as  is  the  good,  so  is  the  sinner;  (and)  he  that 
.  sweareth  as  he  that  feareth  an  oath."  (R.  V.)  Qoheleth 's  con- 
clusion is  that  pleasure  is  the  end  of  life,  and  his  admonition  is 
to  enjoy  as  happy  an  existence  as  possible.  "Go  thy  way,"  he 
says  (ix,  7-8),  "eat  thy  Bread  with  joy,  and  drink  thy  wine 
with  a  merry  heart;  for  God  hath  already  accepted  thy  works. 
^  '  Let  thy  garments  be  always  white ;  and  let  not  thy  heart  lack 
/.ointment."  (R.  V.)  After  thus  endeavoring  to  dispel  the  il- 
]  lusions,  as  they  seem  to  him,  of  fear,  he  is  consistent  in  his 
further  counsel  that  life  be  regarded  and  employed  as  a  long 
holiday  into  which  no  sorrow  or  pain  is  ever  to  be  admitted. 
Nevertheless,  all  sensuous  delights  are  barred  out  of  his;  scheme 
of  happiness,  nor  do  wealth  and  luxury  necessarily  bring  real 
pleasure  with  them.  On  the  contrary,  the  unbridled  desire  for 
these  serves  only  to  disturb'  the  serenity  of  the  mind,  and  there- 
fore begets  pain  rather  than  pleasure.  Genuine  happiness  is 
dependent  upon  self -sufficiency.  "The  sleep  of  a  laboring  man 
is  sweet,  whether  he  eat  little  or  much;  but  the  fulness  of  the 
rich  will  not  suffer  him  to  sleep"  (v,  12,  R.  V.),  It  is  the 
restriction  of  wants,  rather  than  the  enlargement  ofi  possessions, 
which  makes  one  rich  in  reality.  The  simplest  fare  yields  as 
much  enjoyment  as  the  most  dainty,  and  is  much  more  conducive 
to  physical  health.  Neither  Epicurus  nor  Qoheleth  could  recon- 
cile poverty  with  their  ideas  of  the  summum  l}onum,  after  the 
manner  of  the  Stoics.  Want  entails  pain  and  suffering  which 


19 

must,  above  all  things,  bo  avoided;  but  both  counsel  moderation 
of  desires;  and  as  long  as  the  legitimate  wants  of  the  body  are 
supplied,  there  can  be  no  unsatisfied  legitimate  desire  and  hence 
there  can  be  no  suffering.  One  who  cannot,  to  this  extent,  at 
least,  raise  himself  above  external  conditions,  cannot  hope  to 
attain  serenity  of  mind.  "Si  cui  sua  non  videntur  amplissima, 
licet  totius  mundi  dominus  sit  tamen  miser  est,"  says  Seneca.* 
Compare  this  saying  with  that  of  Qoheleth  (v,  10),  "He  that 
loveth  silver  shall  not  be  satisfied  with  silver ;  nor  he  that  loveth 
abundance  with  increase."  Epicurus,  we  know,  lived  most  ab- 
stemiously, limiting  his  daily  expenses  for  food  to  one  mina ;  and 
Qoheleth  might,  like  him,  have  been  happy  as  Zeus,  on  no  less 
frugal  a  diet.  To  Qoheleth,  as  to  the  Epicureans,  it  seemed  the 
veriest  folly  to  lose  the  bone  in  grasping  at  the  shadow;  to  give 
up  a  certainty  of  present  good  for  the  uncertain  hope  of  a  better 
future,  and  to  sacrifice  the  end  of  life  to  the  means  of  living. 
Qoheleth  says  (iv,  6),  "Better  is  an  handful  with  quietness,  than 
two  handfuls  with  labor  and  striving  after  wind."  This  self- 
sufficiency,  however,  does  not  consist  in  using  little,  but  in 
needing  little.  Qoheleth  expressly  recommends  fine  garments, 
perfumes,  etc.,f  if  one  have  the  good  fortune  to  possess  them ; 
but  no  one  must  depend  upon  these  for  happiness,  "Behold,"  he 
says,  "I  know  by  experience  that  it  is  goodj  that  every  man 
should  eat  and  drink  and  enjoy  good  in  all  his  labor;"  (R.  V.) 
but  the  senses  are  not  to  be  recklessly  and  blindly  satisfied,  for 
this  would  be  to  degrade  the  wise  man  to  the  level  of  a  fool ;  for 
the  fool  is  the  one  who  walks  blindly,  but  the  wise  man  is 
guided  by^his  wisdom,  his  eyes  are  in  his  head.§  (itfWOTOJJ  D2nrfl- 
Qoheleth  gives  the  rule  which  he  applied  to  his  own  enjoy- 
ment of  pleasure:  "Mine  heart  yet  guiding  me  with  wisdom. "II 
Qoheleth  and  the  Epicureans  have  no  room  in  their  scheme  for 
the  austerities  of  the  Stoics  who  aimed  at  independence  through 
the  subversion  of  the  instincts  of  the  senses  and  by  the  discipline 
of  the  body  to  the  point  of  indifference  to  all  comfort.  The 
senses  are  to  be  gratified,  so  far  as  such  gratification  is  consistent 
with  wisdom  and  intelligence.  They  are  to  be  the  servants — not 
the  masters — of  the  mind.  He  himself  pursued  this  principle, 
even  in  the  matter  of  "cheering  his  flesh  with  wine"  and  "in- 
dulging in  folly.  "1J  He  seems  to  have  resolved  deliberately  to 
surrender  his  body  to  the  allurements  of  pleasure,  without  giving 
too  free  play  to  passion.  He  may  have  been  trying  the  experi- 
ment of  uniting  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  with  that  of  wisdom ;  for 
he  seems  to  strive  after  intellectual  enjoyment  with  no  less 
avidity  than  he  sought  the  gratification  of  his  senses.  Especially 
does  he  seem  to  have  had  a  taste  for  art.  He  built  mansions; 
planted  vineyards,  made  gardens  and  pleasure-grounds;  gath- 

*Bp.  9,  20.  fiii,  13.  $ix,  8. 

§ii,  14.  Hlbid.  til,  3. 


20 

ered  around  himself  men  singers  and  women  singers;  there  is 
much  refinement  and  little  coarseness  in  all  that  we  can  learn 
concerning  his  personal  tastes;  for  in  all  his  pursuit  of  pleasure, 
he  says:  ''My  wisdom  remained  with  me."*  As  has  been 
before  observed,  Qoheleth  despised  folly  and  fools  as  thoroughly 
as  did  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans.  He  is  in  mortal  dread  lest 
his  heir  should  be  a  fool.  "I  hate  all  my  labor  wherein  I  labored 
under  the  sun ;  seeing  that  I  must  leave  it  unto  the  man  that  shall 
be  after  me.  And  who  knoweth  whether  he  shall  be  a  wise  man 
or  a  fool?  Yet  shall  he  have  rule  over  all  my  labor  wherein  I 
have  labored  and  wherein  I  have  showed  wisdom  under  the 
sun.  This  also  is  vanity.  Therefore  I  turned  about  to  cause 
my  heart  to  despair  concerning  all  the  labor  wherein  T  had 
labored  under  the  sun.  For  there  is  a  man  whose  labor  is  wisdom 
and  with  knowledge  and  with  success;  yet  to  a  man  who  hath 
not  labored  therein  shall  he  give  it  for  his  portion."*  No  Stoical 
condemnation  of  folly  could  be  more  scathing  than  that  which 
appears  in  this,  as  in  other  sayings  of  Qoheleth.  We  .must  not 
fail  to  note  how  largely  the  personal  equation,  if  we  may  so 
term  it,  enters  into  all  the  observations  of  Qoheleth.  Almost 
always  he  introduces  the  statement  of  a  deduction  by  the  expres- 
sion TVfrm»  "and  I  have  experienced."  He  seems  to  have  experi- 
mented with  various  theories  of  life  and  conduct,  which  may 
account  for  his  apparent  inconsistencies  and  self-contradictions ; 
but  he  always  comes  back  to  the  emphatic  reiteration,  that  the 
only  object  worthy  of  endeavor  is  wisdom.  As  an  illustration 
of  the  worth  and  excellence  of  wisdom,  he  relates  an  interesting 
incident,  about  the  historicity  of  which  discussion  is  not  necessary 
to  our1  argument,  In  the  ninth  chapter  (vv,  13-16)  he  says:  "I 
have  also  seen  wisdom  under  the  sun  on  this  wise,  and  it  seemed 
great  unto  me;  there  was  a  little  city  and  few  men  within  it; 
and  there  came  a  great  king  against  it,  and  besieged  it,  and 
built  great  bulwarks  against  it ;  now  there  was  found  in  it  a  poor 
wise  man  and  he,  by  his  wisdom,  delivered  the  city;  yet  no 
man  remembered  that  same  poor  man.  Then  said  I,  Wisdom  is 
better  than  strength;  nevertheless,  the  poor  man's  wisdom  is 
despised,  and  his  words  are  not  heard."  This  seems  to  be  a 
fitting  climax  to  Qoheleth 's  discussion  of  wisdom  as  a  power  in 
itself,  and  as  a  regulative  principle  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
In  what  follows,  he  proceeds  to  outline  a  general  plan  for  the 
guidance  of  the  wise  in  the  practical  affairs  of  life — a  plan  which 
is  essential  to  real  happiness.  In  the  first  place,  Qoheleth  is  no 
ascetic.  "Alter!  vivas  oportet,  si  vis  tibi  vivere,"  might  have 
been  his  motto.  Under  any  and  all  circumstances,  every  one 
must  have  friends.  Isolated  happiness  is  a  paradox.  Alone,  one 
is  helpless,  weak  and  exposed  to  all  manner  of  discomfort  and 

*ii,  9.  tii,  18-21- 


21 

even  danger;  united  to  others,  he  is  strong,  and  able  to  live 
safely  and  peacefully.  /A  purely  selfish  motive  prompts  the 
desire  for  friends  and  social  intercourse.  It  is  the  interest  of  the 
individual,  not  of  society,  which  Qoheleth  has  in  view;  the 
benefit  to  society  is  merely  incidental.  Here  again,  Qoheleth  and 
Epicureanism  are  at  one.  Of  course,  only  the  wise  man  will  act 
in  accordance  with  the  scheme  of  Qoheleth,  because  wisdom  is 
necessary  to  the  perception  and  foresight  of  the  advantages 
accruing  from  such  a  course  of  conduct.  In  the  fourth  chapter, 
Qoheleth  sets  forth  the  advantages  of  combination,  and  the  evils 
of  separation.  In  verses  7-12,  we  read :  ' '  Then  I  returned  and 
saw  vanity  under  the  sun.  There  is  one  that  is  alone  and  he 
hath  not  a  second;  yea,  he  hath  neither  son  nor  brother;  yet  is 
there  no  end  of  all  his  labor,  neither  are  his  eyes  satisfied  with 
riches.  For  whom,  then,  saith  he,  do  I  labor  and  deprive 
myself  of  good?  This  also  is  vanity,  yea,  it  is  a  sore  travail. 
Two  are  better  than  one,  because  they  have  a  good  reward  for 
Iheir  labor.  For  if  they  fall,  the  one  will  lift  up  his  fellow;  but 
woe  to  him  that  is  alone  when  he  falleth,  and  hath  not  another 
to  lift  him  up.  Again,  if  two  lie  together,  then  they  have 
warmth;  but  how  can  one  be  warm  (alone)  ?  And  if  a  man  pre- 
vail against  him  that  is  alone,  two  shall  withstand  him;  and  a 
three-fold  cord  is  not  easily  broken."  (R.  V.) 

Here  are  two  striking  and  vivid  pictures.  In  the  first  we 
behold  a  solitary  rich  man  who  expects  to  increase  his  store  of 
happiness  by  holding  himself  aloof  from  all  companionship  with 
his  kind;  but  he  only  injures  his  own  best  interests  and  defeats 
the  very  purpose  of  his  endeavor.  He  becomes  "his  own  worst 
enemy."  The  associations  and  alliances  which  this  foolish  man 
deprecates  lest  through  them  his  wealth  be  dissipated,  and  with 
it  his  happiness,  are  really  the)  only  means  of  attaining  his  end ; 
for  two  men,  laboring  together,  are  able  by  mutual  counsel  and 
assistance  to  accomplish  much  more  than  would  be  possible  for 

any  one  individual  working  unaided.  This  is  the  ^DD  who  is 
the  object  of  Qoheleth 's  contempt. 

In  the  second  picture  is  presented  a  striking  contrast  to  the 
first.  Because  of  the  sudden  introduction  of  the  last  words  "a 
three-fold  cord  is  not  easily  broken,"  there  seems  to  be  some 
ground  for  the  allegorical  explanation  of  the  rabbis  who  re- 
garded one  of  the  travelers  as  Companionship,  the  other  as 
Friendship.  These  two  appear  first  upon  the  scene,  but  soon 
they  are  joined  by  a  third,  Strength,  which  results  from  com- 
bination. Of  course  this  is  only  a  fanciful  conceit,  but  the  num- 
ber "three"  was  a  familiar  symbol  of  completeness  to  the 
Jewish  mind,  and  some  such  idea  may  have  been  in  the  mind  of 
Qoheleth.  /  This  exaltation  of  friendship  has  a  decidedly  Epicu- 
i  rean  flavor.  The  Epicurean  friendship  is  second  only  to  the 
1  Pythagorean,  if  to  any.  "Non  sine  amico,"  says  Seneca  "vi- 


22 

sceratio  leonis  ac  lupi  vita  est."*  In  a  broad  sense,  this  depend- 
ence upon  others  is,  for  Qoheleth  as  well  as  for  the  Epicureans, 
real  independence,  as  being  the  fundamental  principle  of  happi- 
ness and  the  indispensable  condition  of  pleasure.  Since  happi- 
ness and  pleasure  presuppose  dependence  upon  others,  Qoheleth 
is  an  altruist ;  but  from  a  purely  utilitarian  motive.  Give  that 
you  may  get — not  get  that  you  may  give,  is  his  precept.  "Cast 
thy  bread  upon  the  waters;  for  thou  shalt  find  it  after  many 
days."f  (R-  V.) 

In  his  political  ideas,  Qoheleth  is  Stoic  rather  than  Epicurean. 
The  Epicureans  were  monarchists.  "The  stern  and  unflinching 
moral  teaching  of  the  Stoics  had  found  its  political  expression 
in  the  unbending  republican  spirit  so  often  encountered  at 
Rome.  Naturally  the  soft  and  timid  spirit  of  the  Epicureans 
took  shelter  under  a  monarchical  constitution.  "J  The  Epi- 
cureans did  not  scruple  to  render  homage  to  princes,  and  were 
loyally  submissive  to  the  powers  that  be,  even  though  they 
took  part  actively  in  public  affairs  only  when  peculiar  circum- 
stances required  them  to  do  so. 

Qoheleth  has  scant  reverence  for  kings  and  princes  as  such. 
They  are  to  be  avoided  rather  than  courted,  for  it  is  so  easy 
to  incur  the  royal  displeasure;  therefore,  he  argues,  "Keep  the 
king's  command,  and  that  in  regard  of  the  oath  of  God.  Be  not 
hasty  to  go  out  of  his  presence;  persist  not  in  an  evil  thing;  for 
he  doeth  Avhatsoever  pleaseth  him.  Because  the  king's  word  hath 
power,  and  who  may  say  unto  him,  *  What  doest  thou  ? '  "§  The 
king,  then,  is  to  be  respected  as  the  lawfully  constituted  author- 
ity ;  but  he  is  not  hedged  by  any  divinity. 


IV. 

We  have  now  endeavored  to  show  why  the  weight  of  evidence 
compels  the  conclusion  that  the  book  known  as  Ecclesiastes  must 
be  assigned  to  a  period  subsequent  to  the  exile,  and  that  it  bears 
evidences,  such  as  are  not  found  in  any  other  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment writings,  to  the  influence  upon  the  writer's  thought  of  the 
Greek  philosophy  of  the  period.  A  few  general  reflections  upon 
the  character  of  the  book,  as  a 'whole,  may  not  unfittingly  con- 
clude the  treatment  of  our  subject. 

It  may  be  an  indication  of  the  general  effect  of  Greek  thought 
that  Qoheleth  fails  to  set  forth  any  very  positive  ethical  standard 
in  the  sense  of  concrete  moral  duties.  The  author  may  not  be 
chargeable  with  exalting  the  wise  man,  as  do  the  Stoics,  so  far 
above  every  custom  and  all  law  that  he  does  not  necessarily 
forfeit  his  character  for  virtue  by  the  commission  of  even  decep- 
tion, suicide,  or  murder.  Nevertheless,  although  we  find  in 

*Ep.  xix,  10.        fZeller,  op.  cit.  p.  492.         Jxi,  1.       §viii,  2,  3. 


Qoheleth  maxims  for  adversity,  for  patience  under  oppression, 
for  reverence  towards  God,  with  memories  of  pessimistic  moods 
and  meditations  upon  the  joys  of  industry  and  noble  reflections 
upon  benevolence  and  calm  views  of  death,  there  is  also  in 
Qoheleth,  as  in  the  "philosophy  of  the  porch,"  an  excessive  ab- 
stract subjectivity,  which  seems  to  lack  applicability  to  the 
particular  instance.  There  is  a  mournful  beauty  about  the  whole 
book  which  well  comports  with  the  synagogue  appointment,  that 
it  shall  be  read  in  the  season  of  autumn.  The  melancholy 
thoughts  which  its  pages  inspire  in  sensitive  minds  are  in 
striking  harmony  with  the  shortening  days  and  the  falling  leaves, 
"the  beautiful  death  of  the  year."  Qoheleth  has  the  same 
fascination  for  many  natures  as  the  theories  of  Schopenhauer 
and  Von  Hartmann.  It  seems  to  fit  in  with  the  tone  of  joyless- 
ness  which  we  are  tempted  to  think  is  dominant  in  our  modern 
life.  That  high-strung  spirit,  Amiel,  says  in  his  journal,  "The 
happy  man,  as  this  century  is  able  to  produce  him,  is  one  who 
keeps  a  brave  face  before  the  world  and  distracts  himself  the 
best  he  can  from  dwelling  upon  the  thought  which  is  hidden 
in  his  heart.  .  .  .  The  outward  peace  of  such  a  man  is  but 
despair  well  masked:  his  gayety  is  the  carelessness  of  a  heart 
which  has  lost  all  its  illusions  and  has  learned  to  acquiesce  in  an 
indefinite  putting  off  of  happiness.  His  wisdom  is  really  acclima- 
tization to  sacrifice;  his  gentleness  should  be  taken  to  mean 
privation  patiently  borne,  rather  than  resignation ;  in  a  word,  he 
submits  to  an  existence  in  which  he  feels  no  joy  and  he  cannot 
hide  from  himself  that  all  the  alleviations  with  which  it  is  strewn 
cannot  satisfy  the  soul.  The  thirst  for  the  Infinite  is  never  ap- 
peased. God  is  wanting."  This  from  a  Frenchman;  a  source 
to  which  we  are  accustomed  to  look  for  thoughtless,  volatile 
good-humor.  It  is  Stoicism — pure  and  simple.  If  we  may  coin 
a  word,  it  is  also  Qohelethism.  The  "highest  good"  is  only  an 
ideal  after  which  we  should  strive,  but  which  we  shall  never 
succeed  in  making  actual.  And  what  do  our  modern  poets  tell 
us  ?  For  the  poets  are  always  those  who  best  reflect  the  spiritual 
temper  of  the  time.  We  do  not  forget  the  genial  optimism,  the 
strong,  manly  hopefulness  of  Robert  Browning  who  sees  real 
success  in  "Apparent  Failure,"  and  whose  inspiring  note  always 
rings  true : 

'  *  God 's  in  His  Heaven 
All's  right  with  the  world." 

But  a  far  different  spirit  seems  to  move  over  the  page,  as  we 
read  from  Tennyson,  or  Clough,  or  Matthew  Arnold.  They  have 
written  strong  words,  beautiful  words,  even  hopeful  words  some- 
times; but  they  are,  as  a  whole,  to  Browning,  what  A  minor  is 
to  C  major  in  music.  Take,  for  example,  that  beautiful  poem  of 


Arnold's,  "Self-Dependence."  What  is  his  "conclusion"  of 
the  whole  matter? 

"Resolve  to  be  thyself  and  know  that  he 
Who  finds  himself  loses  his  misery." 

The  lines  are  beautiful  indeed,  but  it  is  a  sad  and  mournful 
beauty,  the  beauty  of  the  notes  of  the  captive  bird,  which  is  too 
wise  to  bruise  its  breast  and  wings  against  the  bars  of  its  cage, 
and  so  takes  its  stand  upon  its  perch  and  tries  to  sing  as  sweetly 
as  it  can.  His  only  way  to  lose  his  misery  is  to  find  his  un- 
satisfied, unblessed  and  uncompleted  self.  Matthew  Arnold  is 
only  one  of  the  great  army  of  modern  Qoheleths.  They  acknow- 
ledge and  reverence  an  unknown  and  unknowable  DM^Ni  they 
do  not  know  and  adore  a  personal  and  ever  present  mrP-  There 
stood  once  upon  Mars '  Hill  a  man  who  could  talk  Greek  poetry 
and  philosophy  with  the  men  of  the  Areopagus,  quoting  the 
Epicurean  maxim,  "Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we 
die."  He  said  that  this  was  a  good  enough  philosophy,  "if 
the  dead  rise  not ; ' '  for  if  the  spirit  of  man  go  not  upward ;  if 
this  little  span  of  life  be  all,  we  are,  indeed,  "  of  all  men  most 
miserable."  Upon  that  theory,  what  room  is  there  for  unselfish- 
ness, for  generosity,  for  brotherly  kindness?  In  such  a  scheme, 
the  only  rational  course  is  for  each  one  to  get  as  much,  and  give 
as  little,  as  he  can.  But  in  a  scheme  which  admits  infinity  of 
duration  to  life,  there  must  be  infinity  of  compass  as  well ;  and  we 
cannot  leave  our  neighbor  out  of  the  account.  In  such  a  scheme, 
truth  and  justice  count;  fraternity  and  fellowship  count;  love 
and  loyalty  count ;  for  if  one  member  suffer,  all  the  other  mem- 
bers must  suffer  with  it;  and  nothing  can  be  good  for  a  part 
which  is  not  good  for  the  whole.  Qoheleth  with  his  sad  refrain, 
"Vanity  of  vanities,"  witnesses  to  the  unrest  which  is  the  portion 
of  all  who  miss  the  summum  bonum  of  that  eternal  life  which 
is  to  know  nifP  and  do  His  will. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 


LOAN  DEPT. 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 
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LD21A-60m-8,'70 
(N8837slO)476— A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


iPHUET  BINDER 

Stockton,'  Co 


Y.C  36723 


